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Post-Lecture Discussion
SPEAKER: IGOR GRAZIN
MODERATOR: JOHN B. ATTANAsIo
SPEECH: "THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL
RIGHTS: THE BALTIC STATES' CASE"
DATE: MARCH 2, 1991
Professor Attanasio: In the conference, there has been a tremendous
concern and tension, particularly when Hurst Hannum spoke,
about the values of stability in the international community and
the need to avoid chaos and armed conflict. Professor Grazin also
spoke about the value of self-determination, however one defines
it. Obviously, it is a controversial value, and vague at best.
To the extent that we approach secession, we really risk con-
siderable chaos in the international community. There is going to
be tremendous inertia against recognition of any kind of secession
in international law.
The largest danger seems to be the queue of nations waiting
to secede. If one permits Baltic secession, then two questions im-
mediately come to mind. One is whether other groups in the
Soviet Union will secede or declare substantial independence.
Virtually all the Republics have gotten in line at some level. What
do you do in their cases? This is a huge concern within the Soviet
Union. Even Russia has gotten in line in terms of secession, and
that is perhaps the most difficult problem of all. There is a joke
that goes around in Moscow that eventually the map of the Soviet
Union will be the Kremlin, and everything else will have seceded.
The second problem, as far as the international community
would be concerned, would have to do with the cases like Quebec
and Yugoslavia. Will they get into the queue if some, sort of right
to secession is granted in international law?
To the extent one grants a right at all, it has to be a narrow
one. It has to be incredibly narrow, and that is the only way the
Baltic states can stand any chance at all.
Professor Grazin's talk was an effort to narrow the argument,
and, in some ways, -he did so quite successfully. But one of the
things he pointed out was this notion of a political difference, as
opposed to a religious or ethnic difference. I find his distinction
problematic for two reasons. One reason is that it is very difficult,
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in my mind, to understand why a political difference should count
for more than an ethnic or religious difference. The second rea-
son is that there is really a problem of boundary. To some degree,
one could define an ethnic difference or religious difference as a
kind of political difference. And it is very difficult to separate
political differences from ethnic or religious differences.
Another point is this notion of resistance. Suppose there is
some kind of resistance taking place on the part of the group that
wants to secede. Let me propose a test. The first part of the test
would be territory: the ethnic group occupies the territory. The
second part of the test would be armed aggression. The third part
of the test would be resistance to that armed aggression; however,
we have to define what constitutes adequate resistance. New resis-
tance is inadequate, because just about any claim-as long as
there is new resistance-would then allow secession. The resistance
has to be along the lines of a chain, or a continuum, that begins
at the point of the armed aggression, and continues until the
point of secession. As an alternative test, there should either be
resistance or an impossibility to engage in resistance because of
human rights violations.
The next part of the test should be that other countries do
not recognize the larger union, or, that the group has always tried
to move toward some kind of self-government or some type of
autonomy. That again relies on some kind of continuum, rather
than saying that there is some new claim for autonomy or seces-
sion. The notion of resistance and movement toward self-govern-
ment goes to the element of consent. Was there ever a social con-
tract?
If we consider aggression alone, then I think you would have
to redraw the entire map of the world. Aggression in itself is not
going to make it. Professor Grazin talked about mistakes being
made by the Soviet Union, and that should not count as part of
the test. That would give strong disincentives on the part of the
Soviet Union, or any other former aggressor or current aggressor,
to give any autonomy rights to a group that wants to secede.
Professor Grazin. The chain of secession will violate, or change, the
world. It goes without saying that it is dangerous. But what is,
more dangerous, to seek peaceful solutions to some of these prob-
lems, or to continue to use armed forces, tanks, and chemical
weapons like those used against Georgia? (The same weapons
Saddam Hussein was afraid to use against the United States.)
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So, what is more dangerous? In some cases, the iron fist
works. But I am not sure in the Soviet Union, particularly in Rus-
sia, that this will work. So, in every instance, we have the question
of the price of self-determination, the price of independence. For
the Soviet Union, the price of denying the right of self-determina-
tion in the long run will be much higher than allowing self-deter-
mination. I am absolutely sure that the day after the secession of
the Baltic states, economic necessities will force the two sides to
negotiate. But first, this old regime in the Soviet Union has to be
destroyed. It needs a new start.
Now about the test. There is one criteria that does not fit the
Baltic case: the test of continuity of resistance. From 1952 until
1988, there has been no real resistance-small groups here, small
groups there, but it was not a consistent resistance. I hope that
you will focus on another criteria. During that same period, the
United States and others recognized the governments as govern-
ments in exile.
Participant: Has there ever been any explanation given by the rest
of the world, and especially by the United States, for not signifi-
cantly addressing the problem of Soviet aggression in the Baltics
thirty years ago, when there, might have been more of a chance to
counteract it?
Professor Attanasio. Other than nuclear war?
Professor Grazin: Exactly. I prefer international law, but there are
things even more important than international law: power,
strength, and national self-interest. In the beginning of the 1950s,
'a strong response by the United States and others could have
meant World War III.
Participant: We are facing the construction of a phantom; namely,
the danger of secession. What would be wrong, for example, with
an empire like the Soviet Union disintegrating, provided it were
done peacefully? Why shouldn't the fifteen Soviet Republics, or
whatever states could form some economic unit, or even Quebec,
establish their own statehood? I think a phantom is created by
always pointing to the danger of the instability of world order. I
think world order is much more destabilized by the growing num-
ber of movements of nations who try to get statehood on their
own.
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Now to your test. I would forcefully and completely disagree
that there would have to be an armed aggression. It might very
well be that a nation has been part of a state for a very long time
and has no history of aggression; yet, international law would not
have supported its secession. So what we had before was perfectly
all right with respect to international law. What should be made
of a nation's wish of self-determination which would lead into
independence?
Another criteria to which I would not subscribe is adequate
resistance. It could very well happen that, within any given nation,
some group will develop into a recognized entity. That group
could say it wants to exercise its right of secession. I suppose the
underlying reasons for adding this criteria to your test is a re-
sponse to what I have called this "phantom of danger," namely,
the chain reaction of secession movements.
Professor Attanasio. If I can just react to that very quickly. First of
all, I only propose the test as a minimum. That is, I do not pro-
pose this as an universal test. It seems to me the Baltics can be
incorporated into this test, depending on how you define resis-
tance.
With respect to the phantom, I lectured in Moscow for four-
and-one-half months-actually, this time last year I was in Mos-
cow-and I learned that government officials hardly view it as a
phantom. It is an incredibly real problem for them. If the Baltics
have some hope of seceding, they have to have some kind of a
narrow argument. I think that is true as a practical matter.
Professor Grazin: I would question this vocabulary for the kind of
political action I am talking about. Using this word to permit
someone to secede means that your conception of the serenity is
exactly the conception of serenity which Gorbachev presented as a
legitimate one, which really does not allow secession at all.
Who is against the independence of the republics in Yugosla-
via? Basically, it is the Russian military, the KGB, and the military
in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is the first country in Eastern Europe
where the armed forces have created a "normal" political party,
which, in turn, argues that it should govern Yugoslavia. According-
ly, there is not just military aggression in Yugoslavia, but there is
also a political component to that aggression.
You must take advantage of your opponent's mistakes. You
see, Gorbachev is really loyal to the regime (he is a graduate of
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Moscow University), but he has forgotten a little clause in Soviet
law. The fact is that if less than fifty percent of the voters partici-
pate in a referendum, then the result is invalid. It is void. This
law still exists, and I do not know how it happened. And very
probably, in Lithuania alone, less than fifty percent of its people
will come out to say "no" to Gorbachev's referendum. Gorbachev's
referendum question is similar to the referendum on slavery in
Kentucky, if I am not mistaken. The question was whether to ex-
pand slavery or not. But at the time of that referendum, the ma-
jority in Kentucky did not want slavery at all. So, whether you
want Gorbachev's "new" Soviet Union or the old Soviet Union is
Gorbachev's question, but no one else's.
Professor Attanasio If I could react quickly, since my test has be-
come an issue. First of all, I am hardly proposing it as a universal
test. Most of the criticism assumes that it is being proposed as a
universal test. All I am saying is it is a test that would allow seces-
sion. That is a wholly different matter.
The second point is that Abe Lincoln would disagree very
much with your theory of secession as well. A civil war was fought
in the United States, basically because the southern states of the
Confederacy adhered to that theory. That is not to say they were
necessarily wrong, but there was a substantial group of people who
did disagree with it.
The third thing is that there is even a more powerful consti-
tutional argument. Article 137, if I'm not mistaken, gave the re-
publics the absolute right to enforce provisions of the Constitution
through their republican legislators. That constitutional provision
gave authority to the Republics. Unfortunately, that article was
abrogated from the Constitution sometime ago, which neither Igor
nor I can figure out.
Participant As a citizen of Virginia, which is the home of Rich-
mond, the capital of the Confederacy, I just wanted to make an
observation about this historic fact, as you put it, about the Civil
War. The United States tried confederation, and it didn't work. It
was a confederation which the states created, and the reason that
the Preamble of the U.S. Constitution begins with "We the people
of the United States . . . " was precisely because the representa-
tives of the Constitutional convention did not want the new gov-
ernment to be a creation of the states. They wanted to go directly
to the people, and that is why they had ratifying conventions with
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representatives elected directly by the people, instead of allowing
the already existing state legislators to represent them.
I would point out that the Soviet Union is different. The
Soviet Constitution is, in fact, a constitution of a federation, and
the right to secession is included in the Constitution. I think the
danger of secession is perhaps a slippery slope argument-if you
allow one republic to secede, perhaps the others will too. But I
think it is a little beside the point. The Baltics' right to secede is
already part of the constitutional order. Perhaps there will be a
new sort of confederation formed after the secession of the
Baltics. It is a question of considerable importance, not just for
the Soviet Union.
One of the alternatives to secession, historically one of the
most common alternatives, has been obliteration. Nations which
have been denied their nationhood, the Armenians for example,
have eventually caused so much trouble for the dominant state
that they faced extermination. This has been a continuing fact of
world history. Whenever we are talking about the dangers of seces-
sion, there is also a great danger of extermination. It is a continu-
ing problem, for instance, in many of the African states.
Professor Grazin: That is a counterargument designed to protect
trapped minorities. What will happen, let's say, to the Russian
minority in Lithuania, if Lithuania would secede? Again, it brings
us back to the purely ethnic attitude. As a matter of fact, 75 per-
cent of the Russians in Lithuania want to run away from the Sovi-
et Union as quickly as possible. I was really surprised to see a
queue behind the representation of Lithuania in Moscow, because
lots of people wanted to move to Lithuania, hoping that perhaps
Lithuania will secede first. So it is a political question as well.
Participant The Baltic states have a right to self-determination-a
right based in the Soviet law, if you want to use that one-and
they have a right based in international law. The problem is the
procedure. What is the procedure by which you realize the right
to self-determination? Traditionally, there are two ways. If the oth-
er side does not want you to have self-determination, there is war.
The other option is negotiation. I guess everybody agrees that war
is not the solution in this case, and we are left with negotiation. I
think the problem is how this process of negotiation toward the
realization of the right to self-determination is to be carried out.
That is what Gorbachev is saying. He is not saying they cannot
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have self-determination. He is saying that you have to follow cer-
tain procedures.
This fact is helpful, if you accept that the Baltic states are
subject to Soviet law. The next question would be whether the
procedure that has been established is a valid procedure to apply.
If one does not use the constitutional procedure, the other option
is to think of some international procedure. Considering the right
of self-determination on an international level, no procedure ex-
ists. There is no formal procedure to settle the question of self-
determination; however, something informal is going on-informal
in terms of evaluating the benefits and costs of resisting or allow-
ing self-determination. For example, the cost for Gorbachev in
resisting self-determination is probably increasing all the time. So,
he too has an interest in finding a solution. The cost of a war
would be traumatic for Moscow as well as for the Baltic states.
I would like us to think more in terms of how to influence
the international procedures. The weakness of the international
order is that it has yet to develop appropriate procedures. We can
have our different feelings; we can have the test, but who cares
when there is no audience to say this is right or this is wrong?
Professor Grazimn International law can provide assistance in cases
where an aggressor admits to being an aggressor. If the aggressor
denies it totally, however, international law ceases to exist. To get
Gorbachev to start to discuss Soviet aggression in the Baltics is
almost impossible. He never admits that anything is wrong, or that
anything wrong has been done to the Baltic states, Georgia, or the
Ukraine. To be- involved in an international legal procedure, you
must admit that both sides are subject to international law. That is
absolutely and decisively denied today by Gorbachev.
Professor Attanasio: The test I am proposing is more of a form of
negotiation in international law. It is something that would form a
basis for negotiation. It would also alleviate the concerns that
Gorbachev may have.
Participan: It is certainly important, to emphasize both the criteria
and the procedure. Who are the participants, and what are the
relative values they employ? Political factors are very important,
but the key is this sense of identity. With respect to the Baltic
states, what will be the probable consequences for the Soviet Un-
ion? If the alternative is massive deprivation and a separation of
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human rights from the Baltic people, there must be a certain
degree of "Let my people got" If every unit is based upon the
people, in the long run, that result may be most likely to con-
tribute to a stable world. Moreover, one would expect, as Professor
Eide was talking about, a peaceful procedure of negotiation to
exist. But on the other hand, look at how the decision to set forth
self-determination is still done. Iceland is the only country to give
standard recognition; other countries have not come forward. Why
isn't there more support? And in that context, if we have a frame-
work of analysis, other individual governments would be able to
come forward and extend recognition.
And what would be the basis for that framework? In terms of
enhancing the minimum world order, the group desiring self-de-
termination will also contribute to the common interest of all
parties involved, and also enhance an optimum world in the sense
of creating conditions. The people involved in self-determination
will be able to promote justice and peaceful attainment of human
rights, instead of saying, "What is good for us is good for you, and
we don't care about what might be the impact." For example, the
Baltic states could make a very detailed and systematic analysis
defending the position that what is good for its own people would
also, in the long run, be good for the Soviet Union as a whole.
Professor Grazin: The solution will be to apply the principles of
international law, whatever the price may be. In the long run, the
whole of mankind will win. At the same time, I must say that it is
really impractical. The Baltic states have also tried to explain their
position to the world community. I quote the foreign minister of
Russia, who negotiated with one of the western countries: "Don't
forget that the heirs are those who pay the best for the doctor."
Partidpant. I would like to offer a somewhat different prospective
on the notion of what is best for world public order. In the histo-
ry of the post-war human rights movement, the most important
indication of our betrayal of rights has been the misuse of power.
It always will be, because rights involve power, the fight over pow-
er, and the redistribution of power. We have seen this in country
after country. From Iraq's perspective, self-determination motivated
its recent acquisition of Kuwait. But Iraq's action was not done
with any consideration of what was best for world order. It was
merely an application of force. Bangladesh was a clear case in
which we had a state divided by an opposing state, which immedi-
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ately used force. There was no support for this oppression. What
if the Iraqi problem was solved through a contingent of Soviet
and Western interests? We just do not know how all of this is
going to flow. The Soviet Union, in turn, is itself losing part of
what it views as its federal turf. Maybe the notion of power is not
going to resolve this either. This is one area in which we could
apply Professor Chen's theory of economic growth and economic
aid.
Participant:. If we could shift the focus that I think underlines this
discussion so far, I would like to ask Professor Grazin what lesson
the rest of the world should learn from a successful Baltic seces-
sion? Is your claim that because of the Baltics' unique status-and
I emphasize the word unique-they are politically entitled to be
independent? In so far as your argument is based on an, as yet,
undefined concept of international law, it is disingenuous at best,
and dangerous at worst? You cannot make such a suggestion with-
out being able to define what this law is, especially without being
able to come up with the universal test that you suggested you can
do. Such an appeal to international law, and to larger rights of
self-determination, has been taken seriously over the last forty
years. The reality is that secession movements have caused millions'
of deaths. Consider Northern Ireland. Don't you have to choose
between international law and an appeal to a unique political
situation?
Professor Grazimn In terms of the lesson from successful aggression,
let me quote the President of the United States: "The main lesson
will be: Aggression will not stand." It doesn't matter how many
thousands of people are killed. The 300,000 murdered Latvians,
Lithuanians, Russians, Jews, and so on, who were the victims of
Soviet power have not made the right to freedom weaker.
Now, about international law in this context: one thousand
people were killed just because they tried to create a state on the
wrong territory within the wrong borders. If those people lived in
a different state, or at least in different republics, those one thou-
sand women and children would still be alive. So I cannot say that
it is automatically true that all types of secession have lead to
bloodshed. I would agree with you 100 percent, if, by our voting
here in this room, we could prohibit secession. But the secession
claims are independent of our will. We have to try to handle them
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with international law. So, I really rely upon the real authority, the
great authority of international law and human rights.
Participant What, specifically, about your circumstances is to be
considered unique? Suppose we say that Lithuania could secede,
and suppose a minority voted against breaking away from the
Soviet Union. Would the size of the minority in any way influence
your decision as to justifying a secession?
Professor Grazin: The right to self-determination does not belong to
particular ethnic groups. It belongs, I repeat it once again, to the
nation: to Russians, Jews, Germans, and so on; all who live on
Estonian territory. The majority will vote to decide. They have the
right to decide their own destiny.
But now, a comment on the word "secession." It is not exactly
correct, or appropriate, because an occupied territory cannot se-
cede.
